CHAPTER FIVE Serious disease as kinds of living

Ayo Wahlberg
In December 2003, a Church of England curate from Chester in North West England challenged West Mercia police's failure to investigate the termination of a pregnancy in 2001 involving a 28-week old foetus which had been diagnosed with a cleft lip and palate using ultrasound technology. In England, medical termination after 24 weeks is only allowed to save the pregnant woman's life, to prevent grave permanent injury to the health of the pregnant woman or if it is judged that the future child would be 'seriously handicapped' (United Kingdom 1991).
1 The curate's charge was that this termination had in fact been an unlawful killing because there was no risk to the life or health of the woman nor was there any risk that the child would be born seriously handicapped.
Just over a year later, in March 2005, the Crown Prosecution Service informed the curate that she had lost her challenge. The issue to be determined, according to the Crown prosecutor, had been 'whether the two doctors who had authorised the termination were of the opinion, formed in good faith, that there was a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical and mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped' (Crown Prosecution Service 2005) . Following a review of the patient's medical records, guidance from the Royal College of Obstetricians and 1 Up to 24 weeks, medical termination in the UK may take place if two doctors agree that continued pregnancy would involve "risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family… greater than if the pregnancy were terminated" (United Kingdom 1991).
Gynaecologists (RCOG) on medical termination of pregnancy as well as evidence from a number of professionals involved in the patient's counselling and treatment and other medical experts, the Crown prosecutor concluded that 'the abortion was due to a bilateral cleft palate and was legally justified and procedurally correctly carried out' (EWHC 2003) . He would later add, 'I consider that both doctors concluded that there was a substantial risk of abnormalities that would amount to the child being seriously handicapped' (cited in Gledhill 2005) . The case, which has been debated widely in the UK (see Scott 2005a) , is a helpful starting point for a chapter aiming to explore the terms and conditions that allow for normative estimations of 'good life' in reproductive medicine today.
Studies of the social, legal and ethical implications of selection practices in reproductive medicine today have in large part focused on four key areas: the problem of (non-)directive counselling (Pilnick 2002 , Rapp 1988 , Williams, et al. 2002b );
debates about how to (and who should) define what a 'life worth living' and a 'serious disease' are and where to 'draw the line' when it comes to selective reproductive practices (Scott 2005b , Williams, et al. 2002a , Williams, et al. 2007 ); whether or not new reproductive technologies are a form of 'backdoor eugenics' and/or increasingly used to produce 'designer babies' (Duster 2003 , Gosden 1999 , Shakespeare 1998 ; and finally what the responsibilities and duties of prospective parents are in reproductive medicine as compared to the rights of an unborn child (Clarkeburn 2000 , Vehmas 2002 ). In this chapter, I will focus on a different problem, namely how assessments of 'good life' are made technically feasible during the course of selective reproductive practices. Rather than attempting to resolve very much open ethical questions -e.g.
What is a life worth living? Is termination of pregnancy acceptable under any circumstances? Who should make decisions about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy? -I will instead map out the practices that currently enable assessments of vitality, however contested these assessments may be.
To do so, I will examine ongoing attempts to stabilise and delimit the contested category of 'serious disease' in the context of selective reproductive practices in England today. In accordance with principles of informed choice and consent, it is emphasised that decisions about whether or not to begin or terminate a pregnancy must be made by prospective parents in consultation with their doctors. As Rosamund Scott (2005a , 2005b has shown in her analysis of the cleft-palate case, the legal definition of 'seriousness' remains contested. When asked to clarify their position, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists has suggested that since 'there is no precise definition of "serious handicap"… the RCOG believes that the interpretation of 'serious abnormality' should be based upon individual discussion agreed between the parents and the mother's doctor' (RCOG 2008 (Canguilhem 1989) , they also entail certain 'kinds of living'. In this latter sense, life is not an anatomical, cellular or molecular affair, rather it is something that is lived, experienced, coped with, taken advantage of and improved in terms of 'quality', 'hope', 'capability' or 'happiness' (Wahlberg 2007) .
Detecting abnormality
It is vitality that is at stake in practices of selective reproduction. If in the past, selective reproduction was about protecting and improving some kind of collective vitality (e.g.
'population stock' or 'population quality') by preventing persons of 'inferior quality' from reproducing, these days it is argued that selective reproductive practices are aimed at protecting/ensuring the individual vitality of pregnant women (as well as that of their family members) and/or her future child by allowing couples to make informed choices about whether or not to begin or terminate a pregnancy. Carrier screening, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and prenatal screening are all elements in this process. Each involves some kind of 'non-directive counselling' where medical experts aim 'to explain the facts as clearly as possible, giving the person or family accurate information on their options in a way which they can understand' (Clinical Genetics Department 2008) . can also be used to determine the sex of a foetus which may lead some couples to terminate a pregnancy for 'social reasons' (even though abortion in the UK is not permitted on the grounds of sex alone).
Indeed, it is the increasing use of selective reproductive techniques for 'non-medical' purposes that is seen by some as a dangerous slippery slope (see Duster 2003; Kerr and Shakespeare 2002) . In this paper, I will focus on carrier testing, PGD and PND to prevent transmission of disease.
commences, either prior to conception or prior to implantation. Still, according to the logic of these practices, there are some inheritable conditions which some parents may wish to prevent being transmitted to future offspring.
Prenatal diagnosis using amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling, on the other hand, can lead to the termination or continuation of a pregnancy depending on the decision of the couple. Following blood tests, ultrasound examinations, amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling and/or, more recently, 'free foetal DNA' testing, prospective parents are given information concerning the chances that their child will be born with a certain chromosomal abnormality, hereditary disease or congenital malformation. Based on this information and following discussions with their doctor, couples will then make 'informed decisions' about whether they will continue their pregnancy or terminate it by assessing on the one hand, whether there is a substantial risk that the child will be born 'seriously handicapped', and on the other, whether they would be able to cope with caring for a child with a particular condition. As described by the NHS, prenatal testing is 'a method of detecting serious, or potentially serious, disorders in the unborn child...
If a serious abnormality is detected, amniocentesis gives parents the choice of whether they want to have a child with the abnormality, or whether they would prefer the pregnancy to be terminated at an early stage' (NHS 2009).
Of the almost 198,500 legal abortions carried out in England and Wales in 2007, about 1% of them (1,939) were because a substantial risk of serious handicap was deemed (see Table 5 .1). And so, despite advances in forms of genetic testing and reproductive medicine, termination of pregnancy remains the most prevalent form of selective reproduction. Source: Department of Health (2008) Most of the different forms of testing require biological samples obtained through biopsy. Originating from a prospective parent (blood, saliva), pregnant woman (blood, amniotic fluid), an embryo (blastomere) or a foetus (free foetal DNA, chorionic villus), such samples are biochemically and genetically analysed to detect abnormalities in alpha-fetoprotein levels using blood chemistry analysis techniques, numerical and morphological chromosome abnormalities using karyotyping techniques or the presence of specific gene defects using Polymerase Chain Reaction DNA-analysis techniques.
Ultrasound visualising technologies, on the other hand, allow for biometric assessment of foetuses to detect abnormalities in the amount of fluid at the back of a foetus' neck, femur length, biparietal diameter, abdominal circumference or head circumference.
They also allow for morphological assessment as doctors look for 'lemon signs', 'banana signs', 'strawberry-shaped heads', 'golf balls' or other abnormal shapes which have been associated with certain conditions such as spina bifida or Edwards syndrome.
The point being that each of these diagnostic tests has been designed to detect abnormalities using genetic, chromosomal, biochemical, morphological or biometric markers associated with specific diseases or conditions. Abnormalities are detected against 'normal' blood substance levels, gene sequences, karyotypes and foetal morphologies which have been stabilised through cumulative aggregation of clinical data. And so it is elevated blood substance levels, irregular numbers or arrangements of chromosomes, deleted or mutated gene sequences in a chromosome, deviating biometrics, and/or morphological anomalies that are singled out for further attention following diagnostic tests. Information is conveyed to prospective parents in the form of probabilities and chances as individual markers or combinations of markers are used to calculate risks. For example: if both prospective parents are identified as carriers of Cystic Fibrosis there is a 25% chance that a 'natural' pregnancy would result in a child with CF; levels of alpha-fetoprotein in a pregnant woman's blood together with her age are used to calculate chances of having a pregnancy with Down's syndrome (if the risk is calculated at more than 1 in 250, the pregnancy is classed as 'high risk'); and karyotype analysis following amniocentesis is considered to be 95-99% accurate in identifying chromosomal abnormalities in a foetus. Source: Department of Health (2008) Now, what is important to underscore is that while these various diagnostic tests generate biological results which give parents an idea of the chances that their child will be born with a certain disease or condition, they do not tell them anything about whether or not the disease or condition in question is serious. This involves an entirely different form of assessing vitality, and it is this form of vital assessment that will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. In the following, I will show how the question of 'seriousness' is contested and stabilised in screening for Cystic Fibrosis carriers, PGD embryo screening to avoid transmitting Spinal Muscular Atrophy disease and prenatal screening to identify Down's syndrome pregnancies. In each case, we will see how the problem of selection (i.e. whether to begin, terminate or continue a pregnancy) is linked to estimations of 'seriousness' which in turn rely on temporal notions of onset and life expectancy on the one hand, and experiential notions of severity, suffering and quality of life on the other. Indeed, I will suggest that in reproductive medicine today, it is serious disease as certain 'kinds of living' rather than as biological abnormality, error or inferiority that informs selective practices.
'Faulty' modes of living
In his analysis of how different concepts of pathology have historically instigated novel understandings of biological normativity, Georges Canguilhem concludes that "there is no life whatsoever without norms of life, and the morbid state is always a certain mode of living" (Canguilhem 1989: 228 In contrast, in the cases of Cystic Fibrosis and Spinal Muscular Atrophy, parents are told that they may be 'carriers' of the culpable genetic errors and therefore may be at risk of transmitting these errors to an offspring. As such, parents are advised that while carrier testing is relevant for CF and SMA, it is not applicable for Down's syndrome which at this time can only be detected after conception. Moreover, since it is almost impossible to predict which couples will conceive a child with Down's syndrome, PGD is rarely a realistic option, whereas couples where both partners are known to be carriers of CF or SMA may well opt for PGD as they are informed they have a 25% chance of giving birth to a child with that condition. Prenatal testing for Down's syndrome is offered to those prospective parents who are judged to be 'at risk' following routine antenatal ultrasound scans. 
Normal lifespan and spans of normal life
Type II (Intermediate)
Onset between 3 months and 2 years. Able to sit, but not stand without aid. Survival into adulthood possible.
Type III (Mild)
Also known as Kugelberg-Welander Disease. Onset usually around 2 years. Able to walk. Normal lifespan.
Adult Onset SMA
Number of forms differing in age of onset. Degree of weakness is variable. In the 1950s, many people with Down's syndrome did not live past the age of 15. However, due to a better understanding of the condition, and 4 While there are no available statistics on this, presumably the other 500+ terminations were carried out on the legal grounds that a medical termination of pregnancy was necessary to protect the pregnant woman's physical and mental health (Scott 2005b: 310 Another temporal component in determinations of seriousness is that of onset, and again we can see that there is considerable variability with some conditions manifest at birth, some manifesting themselves 'around 2 years' and others much later in adulthood.
Indeed, in 2006, the HFEA for the first time approved embryo testing for susceptibility genes associated with inherited cancer pointing out that 'these conditions differ from those already licensed before because people at risk do not always develop cancer, it may occur later in life and some treatments may be available' (HFEA 2006) . So, in some cases, the mere possibility that a condition will set in at a later point (perhaps never) is deemed 'to be sufficiently serious to merit the use of PGD embryo testing' (ibid.) so as to avoid implanting susceptibility-gene-affected embryos, or put in another way, to prevent potentially faulty modes of living from coming to term.
With onset, it is not so much a 'normal lifespan' as a span of 'normal life' (prior to onset) that is the norm against which seriousness is measured, and again, onset appears as a continuum with no clear cut off point. In these accounts, it is not so much genetic errors, medical symptoms and life expectancies that inform prognoses, rather it is patient experiences, coping strategies and condition management advice. Whatever the limitations imposed on a child by these conditions (learning difficulties, immobility, tiredness, pain, poor immunity, etc.), it is argued that they can nevertheless be fulfilling according to their own terms.
For example, the UK's Down's Syndrome Association argues that if individuals with Down's syndrome have had a low quality of life this has more to do with prejudice than with their condition:
In the past it was believed that there were many things that people with Down's syndrome could not do when in fact they had never been given the opportunity to try. Today these opportunities have never been greater with When the HFEA approved PGD for certain late onset diseases they made a point of stressing that:
decided not to have their son who had Tay Sachs disease resuscitated: 'one day when he was about 2½
and had to be admitted to the hospital. He was very weak. He was having trouble eating and drinking. We knew at this point it was not possible for him to have any quality of life, and it was at this point we made that decision. It was very difficult to make, and prior to his getting this sick I would not have been able to make that decision.' (Borfitz and Margolis 2006: 11) .
The role of medicine has always been to try to relieve pain and suffering and to try to improve the quality of life for people... [Our] decision today deals only with serious genetic conditions that we have a single gene test for. We would not consider mild conditions -like asthma and eczema -which can be well-managed in medical practice… The Authority agreed that we should consider the use of PGD embryo testing for conditions such as inherited breast, ovarian and bowel cancers given the aggressive nature of the cancers, the impact of treatment and the extreme anxiety that carriers of the gene can experience. (HFEA 2006) With so many variables in play (severity, suffering, pain, dependency, immobility, disability), it is little wonder that there is no consensus when it comes to determining which diseases are serious using quality of life criteria. The UK's Human Genetics Commission has summed up such variability as follows:
it has proved difficult to define what is meant by 'serious'. One way of doing this would be to draw up a list of conditions that are considered to lead to a very poor quality of life… However, this approach fails to recognise that quality of life judgements are subjective, and that genetic disorders are variable in terms of severity and health outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that people with genetic disorders, their families and professionals all have different views about which conditions give rise to a poor quality of life.
In general, those who have direct experience of living with a genetic disorder are likely to rate the quality of their lives more highly than would medically As such, literature provided to prospective parents also includes information on the difficulties that other parents have had in coping with caring for a child with a genetic disorder. Prospective parents are also encouraged to get in touch with other parents who have given birth to and cared for a child with a similar genetic condition.
Through such interaction, parents are reassured that they are 'not alone' as they learn how 'most parents find out that their baby has Down's syndrome soon after the birth and the news is a great shock', how parents can be left 'feeling confused, angry, alone or afraid' after a diagnosis of SMA or how 'coping with CF at the time of diagnosis… can be challenging ' (Cystic Fibrosis Trust 2008b , DSA 2007 , Jennifer Trust 2008b .
Carers' descriptions of living with a genetic condition in terms of coping are of course not limited to the moment of diagnosis, for once a diagnosis is confirmed parents will often want to do everything to ensure that their affected child is given the best possible life under the circumstances. This can be a challenging task to say the least: The demands of living with a young child can be overwhelming particularly when the fact that your child has Down's syndrome may lead to extra appointments with doctors and therapists and anxiety in the early years.
( DSA 2007: 11-12) At the back of our minds we did keep alive the possibility that she might not have Down's syndrome but we knew that we would be able to cope if she did -there's so much out there for her. Schools are integrated and there are even actors with Down's syndrome. There's a worker at our local supermarket who has Down's syndrome and we think that it doesn't need to hold you
back. (BBC News 2008)
We were determined that Amar [diagnosed with SMA Type 1] would have the best time we could imagine... We never complained about the sleepless nights, possibly three hours of sleep a night on average. My wife stayed at home with Amar all day, every day, until I came home from work in the evening. He stayed with me, so I could give my wife a break. We were committed and got used to it, and enjoyed it, even though it was hard. We never complained. We coughed every cough for him; we wanted him to stay as well as possible. (Jennifer Trust 2008c) The argument that the impact of a genetic condition on a family's life is relevant when determining what constitutes seriousness is perhaps one of the most controversial.
As Scott has shown, in a 'wrongful birth' case from 2000 in East Dorset which was brought by parents who argued that they had lost the opportunity to abort a child with Down's syndrome because of a breach of duty, the presiding judge concluded that 'the birth of a disabled child will dramatically affect the quality of life of both parents and it is to be inferred that a reason why they would have terminated the pregnancy was to avoid such a loss of amenity in their lives ' (cited in Scott 2005a: 402) . A distinction is made between caring for a 'normal child' and one affected by a condition such as Down's syndrome ('She will need care and supervision for the rest of her life' (ibid.: 401)). What is more, it is a normative distinction since looking after an affected child is seen to negatively impact the quality of life of the couple.
Such arguments have been controversial especially because they are considered to discount the interests of the future child in favour of the 'selfish' interests of the parents.
It is also suggested that once the future child's interests are set aside, the problem of 'serious disease' can very quickly become framed in terms of burden, whether this burden is considered psychological, social, emotional, financial or genetic. For example, Tom Shakespeare has argued that if sufficient care is not taken 'decisions about reproductive choices are likely to be influenced by the fact that an unjust society means that having a disabled child places a severe financial and practical burden on a family' (Shakespeare 1998: 679) . And if reproductive selection becomes a matter of alleviating burdens for collectives (e.g. 'family', 'society', 'population', 'human gene pool') then reproductive medicine is once again well on its way down the slippery slope to eugenics (see also Wahlberg 2008 Williams et al. (2002a: 65) have also shown how some practitioners find it hard to 'draw the line' with one of their respondents arguing: 'I mean, I've seen a woman who had a cleft lip and palate herself, her first child had a cleft lip and palate, she had another baby with a cleft lip and palate and she said, "I want a termination". Now who am I to say to her that I know more about cleft lip and palate than she does?' whether or not to begin, terminate or continue pregnancies that may result in a child being born with a serious disease or condition.
